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A CALCULUS OF INCONSISTENCY I: SENTENTIAL
LOGIC
DAN SEABOLD, STEFAN WANER, AND STEVE WARNER
Abstract. We describe a graph-theoretic syntax for self-referential for-
mulas as well as a four-valued logic to include contradictory and inde-
pendent formulas. We then explore the degree to which generalized
truth tables can be realized in our theory, and go on to describe a model
theory for sentential calculus, wherein models are allowed to include con-
tradictions (such as the “Liar”) and formulas that result from them as
an integral part of their structure. This sets the groundwork for a sequel
in which we construct models of set theory that include contradictions.
1. Introduction
Any logic that permits self-reference opens itself to paradox, as illustrated
by the Liar’s paradox, a simple form of which states “This statement is
false.” In their study of the subject, Barwise and Etchemendy [BE] address
this and similar paradoxes by introducing a “non-Russellian” logic that in-
cludes a hierarchy of discourse in which self-referential statements, such as
the Liar, are either true or false.
If we wish to include self-referential statements without abandoning the
Russellian system of logic, we are faced with contradictions. Classically, one
has the high school proof that any contradiction implies that all statements
are contradictions, thereby contaminating the whole universe with contra-
diction. Consider the simplest variant of this argument: “If p is true then
p ∨ q is true for any formula q, but then if p is also false, it follows that q
must be true.” In our analysis of this argument, if p is a contradiction and q
is false, then p∨ q is also a contradiction, and our rules for computing truth
will not permit us to conclude anything more about q. In this way we avoid
contaminating the entire model.
The approach we shall use to compute truth is the traditional hierarchical
approach: the truth of formulas that are not subformulas of axioms can
only be computed from “below”; that is, from a knowledge of the truth of
subformulas. They can only be inferred from above if they are subformulas
of axioms, or through arguments (such as rules of inference) outside the
model.
Date: September 2004.
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With regard to rules of inference, we shall see that all the classical rules
of inference still apply, but that few of them are tautologies (in particular,
modus ponens is not a tautology).
Our models of logic will be based on graphs analogous to those used by
Axcel to model set theory with antifoundation in [A]. In this paper we
restrict our syntax to sentential logic; richer forms of syntax such as that in
Smullyan [S] will be developed in a future paper. We shall also find that the
most natural setting in which to include contradictions is through the use
of a four-valued system of logic, where the two additional values are L (“is
a lie”) for contradictions, and V (“is vacuous”) for independent statements.
In an unpublished manuscript, Linton [L] outlines a four-valued system of
logic whose four truth values are somewhat reminiscent of ours, although
he does not interpret them as we do here, nor does he develop a calculus of
their use or an application to self-referential statements.
In §2, we describe the basic calculus of our four-valued system of logic
and observe that all formulas in classical propositional logic can be identified
with special formulas in our sense. In §3, we describe (Proposition 3.5
and Theorem 3.9) exactly what kinds of truth tables can be realized by
formulas. In §4 we outline our model theory for sentential calculus, describe
how to determine truth in a model, and give models of sentential calculus
that extend the classical one; one in which the Liar is a contradiction, and
another in which the Liar is false.
The authors are grateful to Sylvia Silberger and Aileen Michaels for many
stimulating conversations, and especially to Scott Davis for his Honors thesis
work on computing all possible unary gates and for his observations on an
early version of this work.
2. Preliminaries
Axcel [A] constructed anti-foundational models of set theory using pointed
graphs with cycles to model membership hierarchies in sets. In the same
vein, the formulas in our version of sentential logic will be pointed graphs
with cycles. If Γ is a set, recall that a Γ-graph consists of a finite set Z of
directed edges together with functions S : Z → Γ and T : Z → Γ called
source and target maps respectively. We refer to the sources and targets
of the arrows as nodes. If z is a directed edge, then the node T (z) is called
a child of S(z), while S(z) is called a parent of T (z).
A subgraph of a Γ-graph G is a Γ-graph H each of whose nodes is a
node in G such that H is closed under children in G, and if z is an edge in G
between nodes in H, then z is in H. A family is a subgraph consisting of a
node and all its children. A path through the graph is a finite sequence of
nodes 〈n0, . . . , nk〉, each connected to the next by a directed edge. If such a
path exists then nk is a descendant of n0. A pointed Γ-graph is a pair
(G,n∗) where G is a Γ-graph and n∗ is a distinguished node in G.
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The nodes in our graphs will be propositional letters and labelled k-
ary boolean operators: pairs (p, γ) where p is a label (in some alphabet
set) and γ : {t, f}k → {t, f} for some k ≥ 0. (We can think of propositional
letters as labelled −∞-ary boolean operators so that all nodes are labelled
operators.)
Definitions 2.1. Let Γ be the collection of all labelled boolean operators
and propositional letters. A formula is a triple Φ = (G,n∗, F ) where:
(1) (G,n∗) is a pointed Γ-graph such that nodes with k children are
k-ary boolean operators for k > 0 and nodes with no children are
either constant boolean operators or propositional letters.
(2) F is a set of nodes of G which are said to be free.
In order that the interpretation of a graph not be ambiguous, we assume that
the set of children of each node is ordered. A pointed subgraph of a formula
Φ is called a subformula if its free nodes are free in Φ. Its distinguished
node need not coincide with that of Φ.
Remark 2.2. In formulas of classical sentential logic, the propositional
letters can be thought of as free variables. We have generalized this idea by
designating arbitrary nodes in a formula as free.
Note that each propositional letter can occur only once in a formula,
whereas the same boolean operator can occur multiple times with different
labels. Following are two simple examples of formulas. In displaying a
formula, we omit the labels on the boolean operators, we arrange the arrows
originating at each boolean operator from left to right to reflect the order
of their children (when order is important, as in the case of non-symmetric
operators), we place a “∗” next to the distinguished node, and we show free
nodes in double circles:
a b
/.-,()*+→ ∗
  A
AA
AA
AA
AA
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
}
/.-,()*+p /.-,()*+q
/.-,()*+∨ ff∗
/.-,()*+p
Remarks 2.3.
(1) Formula a is the classical formula p→ q.
(2) Cycles in the underlying graph permit us to encode self-referential
formulas. For instance, b above can be read as “p ∨ b”.
(3) We can encode formulas in classical sentential logic (such as a above)
using trees as the underlying graphs (see below).
(4) Although we disallow duplicate copies of propositional letters in our
graphs, classical formulas mentioning a propositional letter more
than once can obviously still be realized by identifying the corre-
sponding nodes.
A CALCULUS OF INCONSISTENCY I: SENTENTIAL LOGIC 4
Barwise and Etchemendy construct a syntax for self-referential statements
in [BE]. Following is a list of some of their examples showing their notation
and our equivalent representation of these statements as formulas.
Examples 2.4.
(1) The Liar (“This proposition is false.”):
φ = [Fa φ]
/.-,()*+¬
∗
ff
(2) The Strengthened Liar (“The Liar is false.”):
φ = [Fa φ]
ψ = [Fa φ]
/.-,()*+¬ ∗ // /.-,()*+¬ ff
(3) Liar Cycle of Length Three (“The next proposition is true. The next
proposition is true. The first proposition is false.”):
φ1 = [Tr φ2]
φ2 = [Tr ψ]
ψ = [Fa φ1]
/.-,()*+¬ ∗
  B
BB
BB
BB
B
/.-,()*+=
>>|||||||| /.-,()*+=oo
(4) The Contingent Liar (“Max has the three of clubs and this proposi-
tion is false.”):
φ = [Max H 3C] ∧ [Fa φ]
/.-,()*+∧∗
 



''/.-,()*+p /.-,()*+¬
gg
Note that the propositional letter p corresponds to the proposition
[Max H 3C].
(5) Contingent Liar Cycle (“Max has the three of clubs. The next propo-
sition is true. At least one of the first two propositions is false.”):
φ1 = [Max H 3C]
φ2 = [Tr ψ]
ψ = [Fa φ1] ∨ [Fa φ2]
/.-,()*+∨∗
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
  A
AA
AA
AA
A
/.-,()*+¬

/.-,()*+=
OO
/.-,()*+¬oo
/.-,()*+p
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Again, p corresponds to [Max H 3C].
(6) Lo¨b’s Paradox (“If this proposition is true, then Max has the three
of clubs.”):
φ = [Fa φ] ∨ [Max H 3C]
/.-,()*+→
&& ∗// .-,()*+p
(Note that the node p is not free.)
(7) Gupta’s Puzzle (“Max has the three of clubs. The last two propo-
sitions are true. At least one of the last two propositions is false.
Claire has the three of clubs. At most one of the first three propo-
sitions is true.”):
φ1 = [Max H 3C]
φ2 = [Tr ψ1] ∧ [Tr ψ2]
φ3 = φ2
ψ1 = [Claire H 3C]
ψ2 = ([Fa φ1] ∧ [Fa φ2]) ∨ ([Fa φ1] ∧ [Fa φ3]) ∨ ([Fa φ2] ∧ [Fa φ3])
76540123Φ
ww ''OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
OO
O
/.-,()*+∧
77

/.-,()*+∨ //

/.-,()*+¬
__?????????
/.-,()*+p
/.-,()*+q /.-,()*+¬oo
p corresponds to the proposition [Max H 3C] and q to the proposi-
tion [Claire H 3C]. Φ is the boolean operator that says “at most one
of these three is true.” The location of the star will change depending
upon which truth value we wish to compute (see below).
Definitions 2.5. An evaluation of a formula Φ is a function e from the
set of free nodes to the set {T, F, V, L}. A node that is mapped to T or F
is said to be bound as true or false respectively. A proposition is a pair
(Φ, e) where Φ is a formula and e is an evaluation.
If (Φ, e) is a proposition with underlying set of nodes N , then a hypoth-
esis on (Φ, e) is a function H : N → {t, f}. (Note that H is not required to
take nodes bound as true (respectively false) to t (respectively f). However,
we shall see shortly that it will rapidly evolve to one that does.)
If H is a hypothesis on (Φ, e) such that H(n∗) = t (respectively f),
then we say that the formula or proposition is assumed true (respectively
assumed false).
To describe rules for changing the evaluations on unbound nodes, we need
some notation. Let c be a node with children { c1, . . . , cn } (so that c is an
n-ary boolean operator — note that one of the ci may be c itself) and denote
by ρ = (ǫc1 , . . . , ǫcn ; ǫc) a row in the truth table of c. Thus, each ǫ is either t
or f , and ǫc is the output value of c determined by the inputs ǫci . Note that
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permitting loops in the graphs has the effect that rows of the truth table may
include truth values for the same node in two slots: as input and output.
If C is a nonempty collection of children of c, denote by ρ|C the sub-tuple
(ǫci ; ǫc) of ρ with inputs indexed on the children in C. If H is a hypothesis
on a proposition whose underlying graph includes c and its family, denote
by H|C the corresponding tuple (µci ;µc) of ts and fs determined by H.
Definition 2.6. Let H, K be hypotheses on a proposition (Φ, e). We say
that K is an elementary consequence of H, and write H ⊲ K, if K is
obtained from H by changing its value on a single node c in one of the
following ways:
(1) If c is bound as T and H(c) = f , then K(c) = ¬H(c).
(2) If c is bound as F and H(c) = t, then K(c) = ¬H(c).
(3) If c is bound as L, then K(c) = ¬H(c).
(4) If c is not bound and is a parent (possibly of itself), let C be a
nonempty subset of its children, and let ρ be a row of the truth
table of c such that H|C 6= ρ|C, but does agree if we change only the
output coordinate µc of H|C to its negation. Then K(c) = ¬H(c).
(5) If c is not bound and is a child (possibly of itself), let d be a parent,
let C be a subset of the children of d containing c, and let ρ be a row
of the truth table of c such that H|C 6= ρ|C, but does agree if we
change only the input coordinate µc of H|C to its negation. Then
K(c) = ¬H(c).
Note that no elementary consequence can change the value of any node
bound as V . We say that K is a consequence of H, or that the assump-
tion H leads to the conclusion K, and write H ֌ K, iff K is obtained
from H by following a finite sequence of elementary consequences.
Examples 2.7.
/.-,()*+∧ ∗
f
?
??
??
??
?t
f
 



/.-,()*+p /.-,()*+q
⊲
/.-,()*+∧ ∗
f
?
??
??
??
?
f
f
 



/.-,()*+p /.-,()*+q
t /.-,()*+¬
∗
ff
⊲ f /.-,()*+¬
∗
ff
/.-,()*+∧ ∗
f
@
@@
@@
@@
@t
f
~~
~~
~~
~~
/.-,()*+ϕ /.-,()*+ϕ
֌
/.-,()*+∧ ∗
t
@
@@
@@
@@
@t
t
~~
~~
~~
~~
/.-,()*+ϕ /.-,()*+ϕ
(The nodes marked ϕ are arbitrary and distinct.)
Note that one of the following must hold for any proposition (Φ, e):
(T) Every assumption that (Φ, e) is false leads to the conclusion that it is
true, and not every assumption that (Φ, e) is true leads to the conclusion
that it is false.
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(F) Every assumption that (Φ, e) is true leads to the conclusion that it is
false, and not every assumption that (Φ, e) is false leads to the conclusion
that it is true.
(V) Not every assumption that (Φ, e) is true leads to the conclusion that it
is false, and not every assumption that (Φ, e) is false leads to the conclusion
that it is true.
(L) Every assumption that (Φ, e) is false leads to the conclusion that it is
true, and every assumption that (Φ, e) is true leads to the conclusion that
it is false.
Remarks 2.8.
(1) In the cases that not every assumption that (Φ, e) is true (respec-
tively false) leads to the conclusion that it is false (respectively true),
we will sometimes say that (Φ, e) can get stuck in true (respectively
false).
(2) It follows from the definitions that every node bound as T becomes
t under an elementary consequence, and its value is subsequently
fixed as t. Similarly, nodes bound as F turn f and remain so.
The above observation leads us to a four-valued system of logic:
Definition 2.9. A proposition (Φ, e) has a truth value P ∈ {T, F, V, L}
depending on which of the above possibilities holds.
Remarks 2.10.
(1) T stands for “true”, F for “false”, V for “vacuous”, and L for “lie.”
(2) The Liar (“This statement is false.”)
/.-,()*+¬
∗
ff
has truth value L. On the other hand, the Vacuous Affirmation
(“This statement is true.”):
/.-,()*+=
∗
ff
has truth value V .
(3) Let’s compute the truth values of the other formulas in Example 2.4.
Note that they agree with the heuristic reasoning found in Barwise
and Etchemendy [BE]. The strengthened liar has truth value L, as
does any liar cycle. The contingent liar and contingent liar cycle
have truth value F when the propositional letter is bound as F , and
truth value L when the propositional letter is bound as T . Lo¨b’s
Paradox has truth value T (Note that in this example no nodes are
free and we are computing the truth value of the propositional letter
p). In Gupta’s puzzle, under the assumption that Claire has the
three of clubs and Max does not we bind p as F and q as T . By
starring each node in succession we see that the nodes corresponding
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to ∧ and Φ have truth value T , and the node corresponding to ∨ has
truth value F .
Definition 2.11. A formula is well-grounded if no node is a descendant
of itself and every node is a descendant of the distinguished node. It is
strongly well-grounded if, in addition, the free nodes are precisely the
propositional letters.
Note that there is a natural bijection Ψ : W → P from the collection W of
strongly well-grounded formulas to the collection P of formulas in sentential
calculus. If e is an evaluation of Φ ∈ W with the propositional letters
bound as T or F , then Ψ(Φ) has a truth value coinciding with the truth
value of (Φ, e) under the assignment of values to the propositional letters
under Ψ (note that the truth value under these circumstances is always T
or F ). We can therefore identify the strongly well-grounded formulas with
the corresponding formulas of sentential calculus.
Example 2.12. p↔ ¬p can be identified with the following well-grounded
formula:
/.-,()*+↔∗
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
}
  B
BB
BB
BB
BB
/.-,()*+p /.-,()*+¬oo
3. Logical Equivalence and Classification of Propositions
Definition 3.1. A formula Φ is completely connected if each boolean
operator in Φ has every node (including itself) as a child.
Given a formula Φ with k nodes, we can define a completely connected
formula Φ′ by replacing each boolean operator γ : {t, f}q → {t, f} with
a k-ary boolean operator γ′ : {t, f}k → {t, f} obtained by composing γ
with the evident projection π : {t, f}k → {t, f}q. Note that Φ and Φ′ are
indistinguishable in the sense that corresponding hypotheses on Φ and Φ′
have corresponding elementary consequences
Definitions 3.2. The truth table of a formula with k free nodes is the
function h : {T, F,L, V }k → {T, F,L, V } obtained by computing the truth
value of the starred node resulting from each evaluation of the free nodes.
(Implicit here is an ordering of the free nodes, since we are thinking of
{T, F,L, V }k as the collection of all evaluations of the free nodes.) If a
formula contains no free nodes then its truth table consists of its (single)
truth value. The restricted truth table of a formula is the restriction of
its truth table to {T, F}k.
Examples 3.3.
(1) The truth table of the Liar is L.
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(2) If Φ is any formula with k free nodes in which the distinguished node
n∗ is free, then its truth table is the projection π : {T, F,L, V }k →
{T, F,L, V } onto the coordinate associated with n∗.
(3) Following is a representation of the truth table {T, F,L, V }2 →
{T, F,L, V } of the formula p ∧ q:
T F L V
T T F L V
F F F F F
L L F L F
V V F F V
Definitions 3.4. Two formulas with the same free nodes are logically
equivalent if they have the same truth table. They are weakly logically
equivalent if they have the same restricted truth table. A (strong) tau-
tology is a formula whose truth table has constant value T while a weak
tautology is a formula whose restricted truth table has constant value T
The above definitions beg the following questions:
(1) Are weakly logically equivalent formulas logically equivalent?
(2) Are all truth tables realizable? That is, is every function
h : {T, F,L, V }k → {T, F,L, V }
the truth table of some formula with k free nodes?
(3) Are all restricted truth tables realizable?
(4) If Ψ is a subformula of Φ, and we replace Ψ by any equivalent sub-
formula Ψ′, is the resulting formula logically equivalent to Φ?
The easiest question to answer is the first. The formulas
p ∨ ¬p and p↔ p
are weakly logically equivalent but not logically equivalent; the first returns
L when p is bound as L, while the second returns T .
We shall answer the second question negatively below, and in the process
describe which truth tables are realizable. To do so involves first answering
the third question affirmatively.
Proposition 3.5. All restricted truth tables are realizable. That is, every
function h : {T, F}k → {T, F,L, V } is the restricted truth table of some
formula Φ.
Proof. The desired formula Φ will be completely connected with k free nodes
n1, . . . , nk that are propositional letters and a single node n
∗ which is not
free. The distinguished node n∗ is a (labelled) (k+1)-ary boolean operator
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ϕ, specified by
ϕ(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk, ǫ) =


t if h(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = T
f if h(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = F
ǫ if h(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = V
¬ǫ if h(ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) = L
.
Here the last coordinate corresponds to the starred node. It is then easy to
check that Φ behaves as desired. 
Next, we turn to the question of which truth tables can be realized. First,
partially order the four truth values as follows:
Definition 3.6. ≺ is the partial ordering defined on {T, F,L, V } by the
following diagram:
V ≺ F, T ≺ L
Thus, formulas with lesser truth values are more prone to getting stuck.
If (ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) ∈ {T, F,L, V }
k, then let L (resp. V) be the set of indices
i for which ǫi = L (resp. V ). First, the definition of truth leads to the
following observation:
Proposition 3.7. If Φ is a formula with k free nodes and restricted truth
table h : {T, F}k → {T, F,L, V } and if (ǫi) ∈ {T, F,L, V }
k, then
h((ǫi)) ≥
inf
µi∈{T,F},i∈V
sup
µi∈{T,F},i∈L
{h(µ1, . . . , µk) | µi = ǫi if ǫi ∈ {T, F}}
Proof. From the definition of truth, replacing one or more bound T or F
nodes by bound L nodes replaces the truth value of Φ by values at least as
large as the supremum of the original values. Subsequently replacing one or
more of the remaining nodes by V nodes results in exactly the infimum of
the current values. 
Remarks 3.8.
(1) Note that reversing sup and inf in the above proposition gives a
lower bound, and hence a weaker result.
(2) The construction in Proposition 3.5 produces formulas whose val-
ues on elements of {T, F,L, V }k can be computed by replacing the
inequality above by an equality. Thus, it must be shown that we
can introduce additional appropriate elementary consequences in the
construction there without affecting the values on {T, F}k.
Theorem 3.9. Every instance of the inequality in Proposition 3.7 can be
realized.
Proof. Suppose h satisfies the inequality in Proposition 3.7, let g be the
corresponding restricted truth table, and let Φ be the realization of g con-
structed in Proposition 3.5. It suffices to show that we can adjust Φ, without
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altering its restricted truth table, in such a way that the starred node can
change in a prescribed way (from t to f , from f to t or both) when any spec-
ified collection S of free nodes is bound as L. Denote this desired elementary
consequence (on the starred node) by cS .
We accomplish this by expanding Φ as follows. First, add a new free node
nS for every nonempty subset S of nodes in the original collection of free
nodes. Next, construct a new formula Ψ whose restricted truth table agrees
with that of Φ on all evaluations in which all the new nodes are set to f ,
but causes the desired change cS in the starred node precisely when nS is t
and nS′ = f for all S
′ 6= S.
Next, we turn each new free node in Ψ into a “lie detector” as follows:
for each S, write S = {n1, . . . , nr} and replace nS by
(1) [n1 ∧ · · · ∧ nr] ∧ ¬[n1 ∨ · · · ∨ nr]
Thus, the new nodes are no longer free. Call the resulting formula Ψ′. If
the original free nodes are bound as T or F , and if H is any hypothesis on
Φ that causes it to become stuck, then that same hypothesis on Ψ′ with
each nS set to false, and the conjunctions and disjunctions in (1) set to
the appropriate values, is still stuck. Therefore, Φ and Ψ′ have the same
restricted truth table. On the other hand, if any subset S of free nodes is
bound as L, then nS—and only nS— can turn to t in any configuration in
which the old circuit was stuck. But since turning nS on has the desired
effect, we are done. 
Example 3.10. It is instructive to consider the special case k = 1. Call a
formula with one free node that is also a propositional letter a gate. More
specifically, if P1, P2, P3 and P4 are truth values, then a P1P2P3P4-gate is
a gate with truth table T 7→ P1, F 7→ P2, L 7→ P3, V 7→ P4. For instance,
negation can be viewed as an FTLV -gate. [D] has shown that there are
exactly 25 gates out of a possible 256, and has constructed simple formulas
of each type. One non-existent gate is an FTV L-gate.
To end this section, we turn to the question of replacing subformulas by
equivalent ones. Since it is possible for a formula to have edges pointing to
different nodes in a subformula, we shall restrict the kinds of subformulas
we can swap.
Definition 3.11. If Φ and Ψ are any two formulas with no nodes in common,
and p is a propositional letter in Φ, then the formula obtained by replacing
the node p by the formula Ψ is called the substitution of Ψ into Φ at node
p, and is written as s(Ψ,Φ, p)
Proposition 3.12. Let Φ, Ψ1, Ψ2 be formulas such that Φ has no nodes in
common with Ψ1 or Ψ2, and Ψ1 and Ψ2 are logically equivalent. Let p be a
propositional letter in Φ. Then Φ1 = s(Ψ1,Φ, p) and Φ2 = s(Ψ2,Φ, p) are
logically equivalent.
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Proof. Let e be an evaluation of Φ1 and suppose that the proposition (Φ1, e)
has truth value P . That (Φ2, e) also has truth value P follows easily from
Definition 2.6. We show one case as an illustration: Suppose that Ψ1 has
truth value L under the current evaluation (thus Ψ2 also has truth value
L), and suppose that (Φ1, e) can get stuck in T . Let H1 be a hypothesis on
(Φ1, e) such that H1(n
∗) = t and there is no consequence H ′1 ֋ H1 with
H ′1(n
∗) = f . Define the hypothesis H2 on (Φ2, e) by H2(x) = H1(x) for all
nodes x 6= p in Φ and let H2(x) be arbitrary for x in Ψ2. It is then easy to
see that there is no H ′2֋ H2 with H
′
2(n
∗) = f . The other cases are just as
easy. 
4. Models of Sentential Logic
It may seem most natural to generalize the notion of a model (see, for
example, [CK]) by defining a model to be an assignment of truth values to
the propositional letters. However, we wish to create models which admit
inconsistencies of an arbitrary nature, for instance models in which a propo-
sitional letter and its negation are both true. We would also like to create
models in which natural inconsistencies such as the Liar can become true or
false. The following definition serves our needs in this paper, and will also
serve as the basis for our mathematical model theory in the sequel [WW].
Definition 4.1. A model M of sentential logic is a tuple (M,A,B, C,D)
where M is a nonempty set of propositional letters, and A,B, C and D are
disjoint sets of formulas without free nodes.
Remarks 4.2.
(1) The formulas in A are called true axioms. Similarly, the formulas
in B, C and D are called false axioms, contradictory axioms and
independent axioms, respectively. When determining truth, each
axiom will be bound to have the truth value determined by which
of these four sets it is a member (see below).
(2) Since the nodes in our formulas are labelled boolean operators, it
follows that models are possible in which different instances (distin-
guished by their labels) of the same formula are assigned different
truth values as axioms. For instance, some Liars could be true and
others false.
Definition 4.3. Let M be a model. A formula Φ inM is a formula with
no free nodes whose propositional letters are all in M .
We now show how to compute the truth value of a formula Φ in M.
Definition 4.4. A subaxiom of an axiom A in M is a proper subformula
B of A.
Definition 4.5. The truth values of formulas in M are determined as fol-
lows:
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(1) If Φ is an axiom, then its truth value is determined by its membership
in A,B, C or D as above.
(2) If Φ is a subaxiom but not an axiom, its truth value R(Φ) will be
defined as a limit of a nondecreasing sequence of truth values Rn(Φ),
as follows: For any axiom A of which Φ is a subaxiom let A∗ be A
with the star moved to the node for Φ, bind all axioms by their truth
values under (1) that occur as subformulas of A, and compute the
truth value of A∗. Denote this truth value by RA. Then take
R1(Φ) = sup{RA | Φ a subformula of A}.
To obtain Rn(Φ) from Rn−1(Φ), proceed as in the definition of
R1, but also bind all subaxioms other than Φ and occurring as
subformulas of A∗ by their truth value under Rn−1. Let R(Φ) =
supn<ω Rn(Φ).
(3) If Φ is not an axiom or subaxiom, bind all its subformulas that are
axioms or subaxioms by their truth values under (1) and (2), and
then compute the value of the starred node as usual.
Remarks 4.6. (1) Technically, in computing truth we are using formu-
las identical to the ones we are interested in, but with certain nodes
free so that we can bind them.
(2) Note that we do not permit formulas that are not subaxioms to
inherit truth values from formulas containing them as we do in Def-
inition 4.5(2). If we did then the presence of a single L formula
would have the consequence that every formula that is not a subax-
iom would have truth value L. Indeed, if Φ is L and not a subaxiom,
and Ψ is any other formula that cannot get stuck in F , then Φ ∧ Ψ
is seen to be L. But binding this formula as L leads to Ψ having
truth value L. If Ψ can get stuck in F then a similar argument works
using a disjunction instead of a conjunction. By contrast Definition
4.5 will allow us to admit contradictions and contain them.
We write M |= Φ, M |=F Φ, M |=L Φ or M |=V Φ if Φ takes on
truth value T, F,L or V respectively. M is complete if there are no well-
grounded formulas Φ in M such that M |=V Φ (in particular, D contains
no well-grounded formulas).
Example 4.7. Let M = (M,A,B, C,D) where M = {p}, A = {p,¬[= p]}
and B = C = D = ∅. Then the subaxiom [= p] has truth value L in M as
the following diagram shows.
/.-,()*+¬
T
// /.-,()*+=
∗ T
// .-,()*+p
We now relate our models to classical models of sentential calculus.
Definitions 4.8. Let Φ be any formula in the model M. Say that Φ is
generically inconsistent if its truth value inM differs from its truth value
obtained by binding only the propositional letters that occur as axioms by
their truth values in M.
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Also, call a well-grounded formula Φ in the model M special in M if
each node in Φ is either a conjunction, disjunction, negation, equals, or a
propositional letter, and such that no subformulas of Φ of the form “= Ψ”
are axioms. Further, we require that, if Ψ is a subformula of Φ that is a
subaxiom of some axiom A, then the formula “= Ψ” is also a subaxiom of
A (so that the “=” node is bound to at least the same value as its target
when we evaluate truth). In particular, the starred node of any axiom in Φ
must point to only “=” nodes.
Lemma 4.9. Let M be a model all of whose axioms are either propositional
letters assumed true or false, or other well-grounded formulas assumed true.
Furthermore, assume that every propositional letter in M is an axiom. If
there is a generically inconsistent special formula Φ in M, then Φ has an L
subformula.
Proof. Note that, since each propositional letter in M is assigned a unique
truth value, M determines an evaluation e of every formula whose proposi-
tional letters are free and in M. Let Φ be as in the hypothesis and assume
that Φ has no L subformulas. It follows that the truth value of any subax-
iom which is a subformula of Φ can be computed by choosing any axiom of
which it is a subformula, binding all axioms, and then computing the truth
value of the subaxiom’s distinguished node as usual.
Let Ψ be a minimal subformula of Φ which is generically inconsistent
under the evaluation e determined by M. Then Ψ must be an axiom or
subaxiom by minimality. If the distinguished node n∗ of Ψ is an “=” node,
then the definition of a special formula implies that it either has the same
truth value as its target, contradicting minimality, or is L, contrary to as-
sumption. Thus n∗ is not an “=” node.
Since Ψ must be an axiom or a subaxiom, the special property of Φ
now guarantees that n∗ points to only “=” nodes, each of which is the
distinguished node of a subaxiom so that all of these “=” nodes are bound
(when we evaluate truth). Since Ψ is generically inconsistent, binding only
the propositional letters will lead any hypothesis to one in which n∗ has the
opposite truth value. Further the chain of elementary consequences can be
arranged to affect n∗ only in the last step (because Ψ is well-grounded).
If n∗ and the propositional letters are bound, then the same chain of
elementary consequences except for the last is still possible. Since proper
subformulas of Ψ are generically consistent, all nodes except n∗ end up in
their values as subaxioms. Therefore, binding n∗ to its given truth value
will result in an elementary consequence in which the truth value of one of
its children c changes to the opposite truth value of its associated subaxiom
C (recall that n∗ must be a conjunction, disjunction or negation; see remark
below).
One has C < Ψ < A for some axiom A (where < indicates subformula).
A lower bound of the truth value of C is obtained by binding all axioms
that occur in A and then computing the truth value of the node c. However,
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any hypothesis on A will lead to one in which n∗ is assigned its given truth
value. Subsequently, as we have seen, a further sequence of elementary
consequences will change c to the opposite truth value. The definition of
truth value of subformulas now tells us that C must be L in the model,
contrary to assumption.

Remark 4.10. The definition of special need not be so restrictive as to
include only conjunctions, disjunctions, negations and equals. However,
we need to avoid operators which either are, or can behave like, constant
boolean operators. For example the operator ↔ can behave as a constant
unary operator as in p ↔ p. If this formula is hypothesized as false, then
there is no elementary consequence that changes the value of its only child
p.
If T is a set of well-grounded formulas, let T ′ be obtained from T by
writing each formula in disjunctive normal form, and then replacing each
non-starred node n in each formula by “= n”. Call this expanded dis-
junctive normal form. If T ′ is now the set of axioms in a modelM, then
each axiom is special. It follows that any classical theory T is equivalent (in
the sense that it has the same models) to one with a special set of axioms.
Theorem 4.11. Let T be a theory and M a model in the classical sense.
Form the model M(T ) by letting A consist of the formulas of T written in
expanded disjunctive normal form, together with the true propositional letters
in M , and B the false propositional letters in M . Then M is a model of T
in the classical sense iff there are no well-grounded L formulas in M(T ).
When this is the case, the well-grounded formulas in M(T ) have the same
truth values as the corresponding formulas in M .
Proof. First observe that if T ′ is the theory T , but with all axioms written in
expanded disjunctive normal form, then M is a model of T iff M is a model
of T ′. Therefore we assume without loss of generality that the formulas in
T are in expanded disjunctive normal form.
If M is a model of T , then it is clear that all well-grounded formulas in
M(T ) get stuck in their appropriate truth values (T or F ), and hence there
are no well-grounded L formulas. Conversely, if M is not a model of T ,
then there exists a well-grounded formula Φ such that T ⊢ Φ but Φ is false
in the model M . This implies that at least one axiom in T is generically
inconsistent as a formula in M(T ). Since each axiom is special, the lemma
implies that this axiom has an L subformula. 
In [BE] Barwise and Etchemendy describe a class of models which include
false liars. It is therefore natural to ask if there is an interesting class of
models in our sense in which the Liar is false. Uninteresting models can be
constructed by simply binding every formula with an arbitrary truth value.
In an interesting model, truth values must, for the most part, be computed
according to Definition 4.5.
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Definition 4.12. If Φ1, . . . ,Φn are (not necessarily well-grounded) formulas
and Ψ is a well-grounded formula with n propositional letters, let Ψ′ be
obtained from Ψ by replacing its propositional letters with the Φi. Then we
say that the pair (Ψ′, (Φi)) is relatively well-grounded.
Proposition 4.13. If T is any consistent theory with a classical model M ,
then it has a model N (T ) in our sense in which all well-grounded formulas
have the same truth values as the corresponding formulas in M . Further,
there are no L formulas in N (T ), the Liar is false in N (T ), and no relatively
well-grounded formula is an axiom or subaxiom. (Thus, for instance, the
negation of the Liar is true).
Proof. We construct the model N (T ) as the ω-limit of an inductively defined
sequence Mi. Define M0 = M(T ), as in Theorem 4.11, and assume that
Mi = (Ai,Bi, Ci,Di), (i < n) have been defined, with Ai = Ai+1, Bi ⊆ Bi+1,
and Ci = Di = ∅, and such that all well-grounded formulas have the same
truth values as the corresponding formulas in M . To define Mi+1, take
Ai+1 = Ai, Ci+1 = Di+1 = ∅, and
Bi+1 = Bi ∪ {Φ | Φ a minimal L formula in Mi }
Since we are decreasing some truth values in passing from Mi to Mi+1, it
follows that no new L formulas are introduced. Further, since by assump-
tion, no well-grounded formula can be L, their truth values are not affected.
Also, if a relatively well-grounded formula is L inMi, it cannot be a minimal
L formula, and so it will remain unbound when we evaluate truth. Finally,
it is not hard to see that there are no L formulas in the limit. 
Remarks 4.14.
(1) We cannot eliminate all L formulas in just one step. For instance,
the following L formula remains L in M1 because only the bottom
left node is bound as F in M1.
/.-,()*+∨∗
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
((/.-,()*+¬88 /.-,()*+¬
hh
(2) We cannot avoid creating V statements in general. The following
formula has truth value T until the Liar subformula (rightmost node)
is bound as F , whereupon the formula becomes V . (Note also that
we can replace the Liar on the right by any L formula.)
/.-,()*+→88
∗ // /.-,()*+¬ // /.-,()*+¬ ff
(3) We cannot expect to eliminate V statements by binding them as T
or F without (re-)introducing L statements. In the following pair of
formulas, Φ stands for any V subformula. Binding Φ as false causes
the first formula to change from T to L. On the other hand, binding
Φ as true causes the second formula to change from T to L. Note
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that re-binding these new L statements will lead again to further V
statements (parenthetical comment in (2)).
/.-,()*+¬
∗ )) /.-,()*+∨hh //76540123Φ
/.-,()*+¬
∗ )) /.-,()*+∨hh // /.-,()*+¬ //76540123Φ
(4) Barwise and Etchemendy [BE] seem to avoid V statements in their
models of Austinian logic by limiting the amount of information that
is talked about in their “situations.” Our models, on the other hand,
include all formulas.
We end this section with a brief discussion of rules of inference in the
hope of stimulating further research.
Since an instance of modus ponens may be bound as F, V , or L in a model,
we cannot expect a general set of rules of inference to hold in every model of
sentential logic. However, models in which all the axioms are propositional
letters and bound as either T or F are interesting in this regard, since a
large class of rules of inference hold “from without” in such models.
Definition 4.15. Say a model is simple if each axiom is a propositional
letter assumed true or false, and every propositional letter inM is an axiom.
As usual, say that modus ponens holds externally ifM |= Φ andM |=
[Φ → Ψ] implies M |= Ψ, and similarly for the other common rules of
inference from classical sentential logic. If Φ is a (weak or strong) tautology
(see Definition 3.4), write R(Φ) for the rule of inference that says M |= Φ.
Proposition 4.16. If M is a simple model, then the following rules of in-
ference hold: modus ponens, modus tollens, contrapositive, chain rule, dis-
junctive inference, double negation, De Morgan, simplification, conjunction,
and disjunctive syllogism. Further, the rule R(Φ) holds iff Φ is a strong
tautology.
Proof. The last statement is a consequence of our rules for computing truth.
In the case of modus ponens, suppose that M |= Φ and M |= [Φ→ Ψ], but
that Ψ has a truth value other than T . Then consider the three possibilities:
If M |=F Ψ, then Φ → Ψ has truth value F . If M |=L Ψ, then Φ → Ψ has
truth value L. Finally, if M |=V Ψ, then Φ → Ψ has truth value V . We
therefore rule these possibilities out by assumption. The remaining rules
listed can be checked one-by-one. 
Note that the modus ponens formula [p∧(p→ q)]→ q] is a (strictly) weak
tautology, and so cannot hold “internally” in any classical model. Further,
not every weak tautological implication leads to an external rule of inference,
as illustrated by the weak tautological implication (q → (p ∨ ¬p)]. Indeed,
if M |= q, then M 2 (p ∨ ¬p) if p is L, since then M |=L (p ∨ ¬p).
In general, a good set of rules of inference and a good theory of argument
should include rules that predict values other than T .
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